Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia

Ideology, Identity, and Culture

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complicated events to avoid ramifications for its foreign relations and domestic legitimacy. By poking at the ethnic issue, Wongsurawat adds considerable nuances to our understanding of Thailand's alliance with the United States.

In conclusion, the cultural dimensions of the Cold War in Asia make up a vast area that awaits future research. Without understanding the thoughts of Asian actors and their cultural networks, we risk underestimating Asia's role in the Cold War. One must recall that Asia was the only continent where both superpowers met humiliating defeats (the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). It is obvious that these Asian opponents of the superpowers triumphed not by firepower but by other resources, of which cultural resilience is key. If these grand defeats teach us any lesson, it is the need to take Asian actors and their rich cultural milieus seriously, which is just what we attempt to do in this volume.

CHAPTER 2

The Early South Vietnamese Critique of Communism

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In both historiographies of the Vietnam War and the Cold War, the topic of South Vietnamese anticommunism has been typically assumed than studied, labeled than examined and elaborated. That is, if it is labeled at all. In the first two and a half decades after the war, English-language scholarship either set aside the subject of anticommunism altogether or referred to anticommunism to mean the American variety rather than that in the former Republic of Vietnam (RVN).[1] Recent histories are more sensitive to the subject, if still largely lacking in information. The first book-length study of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN), for instance, makes the supportable claim that many "ARVN soldiers enlisted … because of their commitment to anticommunism and the rhetoric contained in [nationalistic] documents and speeches."[2] But it does not elaborate on what anticommunism might have meant to those soldiers, or how they came to commit themselves to the anticommunist cause. Another example, a synthesis-minded general history of the war, recognizes that "no amount of American money and military support could have sustained a struggle until 1975 had there not existed … a huge opposition to communist rule," adding that the "opposition was united only by its hatred of the communists." It further acknowledges the commitment of the Vietnamese anticommunists that enabled them to survive as long as they did even as the Saigon governments were weak while facing an aggressive regime in Hanoi, the latter being the "most strongly armed communist client state in the history of the Cold War." In acknowledging ideological agency among South Vietnamese anticommunists, the book illustrates a shift from previous general histories. But it also leaves the topic hanging without

saying what that opposition might have meant, or why the unified "hatred of the communists" came to be in the first place.[3]

This chapter takes the view that there was indeed intense antagonism against communism among many South Vietnamese. Moreover, this antagonism was not simply a collection of heightened emotions found in any major armed conflict, but possessed a coherent intellectual content. In part, the content derived from differences among Vietnamese regarding modernity and modernization: differences that germinated before the arrival of the Cold War in Indochina, and differences about how to gain national independence and how to build a postcolonial Vietnam.[4] The bulk of this content, however, came from personal and local experiences of communist rule and domination between the August Revolution in 1945 and the Geneva Conference nine years later. This chapter focuses on the anticommunist critique developed by a number of South Vietnamese political and cultural writers between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s, a period corresponding roughly to the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem. For the first two decades after the war, scholarship usually set aside this period and focused instead on the later periods of 1963–1968 and 1969–1973. Since the end of the Cold War, however, historians have paid greater attention to the early period and have opened new lines of inquiry, especially on the diplomatic and military relationship between Washington and Saigon. In addition, post–Cold War scholarship has revisited and reemphasized the subject of ideology, arguing that it matters at least as much as geopolitical and economic concerns.[5] This renewed emphasis on ideology has had an impact on research about the South Vietnamese side, with the most fruitful scholarship on, again, ideological, political, and cultural differences between the United States and the Diem government.[6]

Less clear, however, are the behavior, activities, and beliefs among South Vietnamese anticommunists in general during this period. This chapter aims to shed light on them by looking at a number of publications that came out around and after the Geneva Conference. Its main goal is to clarify what Vietnamese anticommunists believed about their opponents as well as their bases for those beliefs. This chapter does not claim that anticommunists were getting along with one another. Nor does it argue that they necessarily identified themselves with the Diem regime. Many anticommunists worked for his government, and some supported him throughout his regime. But others did not see eye to eye with Diem, and more than a few were censored or imprisoned by his regime.[7] Nonetheless, they shared with Diem an ideological opposition to the theory and practice of Vietnamese communism. It was this opposition that, in turn, informed and drove their actions and contributed to the intensity of conflict throughout the Second Indochina War.

Northern Émigrés and the Urgency of an Anticommunist Critique

Because of the proximity to war and revolution—plus the twists and turns of events since 1945—it was not surprising that many South Vietnamese writers, in the words of the critic and fiction writer Vo Phien, "inaugurated the period after Geneva with works that were heavily political and with strong emphasis on the issue of [communism versus anticommunism]."[8] Accordingly, the early years of South Vietnam saw an outpour of anticommunist books, tracts, pamphlets, and columns, essays, poems, and short stories in magazines and newspapers. The materials came from both government and private sectors, and reflected the freshness of experiences between the August Revolution and the end of the First Indochina War. For anticommunist writers, those experiences provided opportunities to evaluate Vietnam's immediate past in order to draw lessons for its present.

A significant feature in this construction of an anticommunist critique is the presence of a large number of educated northern émigrés that came south during the 1950s, particularly during the migration of 1954–1955. In English-language historiography, the outstanding feature of this migration has been Catholicism, in that the majority of émigrés were Catholics. Obscured by this Catholic-centric emphasis, however, is the fact that most leading political and cultural voices among the émigrés were decidedly *not* Catholic.[9] This was true also of anticommunist writers. A few of the writers identified themselves as Catholic, and some as Buddhists. For most, however, there were no indications of their religious background or whether it played a significant role in their stand. What bound anticommunist writers together were similar experiences of the Viet Minh, and not religious commonalities except for an opposition to communist suppression of religious practices and organizations.

An examination of South Vietnamese anticommunist publications shows that the authors held fierce opposition to Marxist-Leninism. It is possible that the writers pushed their opposition vehemently because they felt inadequate in articulating a clear and convincing postcolonial ideology to the Vietnamese at large. As suggested by Nghiem Xuan Hong, a young Buddhist and émigré attorney (and later an official in the government of General Nguyen Khanh), South Vietnamese anticommunists were painfully aware of their lack of a strong and appealing political program.[10] It is possible too that they manipulated anticommunism to generate fears and rally the popular support that they needed. A number of writings, for instance, pounded over and again on the theme of the large-scale and systematic communist network of lies, deceptions, and brutalities. Nonetheless, the possible exaggerations

revealed the core of their concern, which was a grave fear of communist rule over the postcolonial nation. Although the tone of some anticommunist publications verges on propaganda at times, the overall content reflects genuine fears of the writers. In their view, the experiences of Viet Minh domination and violence during the August Revolution and the First Indochina War sufficiently warranted causes for their fears, and post-Geneva communist control of northern Vietnam drove those fears a few notches higher.

Anticommunist print materials came in different kinds. Some stories and arguments amounted to little more than crude caricatures while some others were tightly drawn and elongated into hundreds of pages. Some publications, such as a short fictionalized tale about a young northerner living in Viet Minh–controlled zones that won a government-sponsored national contest, were little better than propaganda in both content and form. But others, such as two long essays by Thai Lang Nghiem, later a senator in the Second Republic, showed great nuances and sophisticated arguments about differences between communism and nationalism.[11] Whatever the degree of sophistication, these materials were characterized by an urgency in alerting Vietnamese to—and educating them on—the dangers of communism.

The urgency came from the belief that the communists were able to dupe many Vietnamese who were ignorant or not sufficiently educated about Marxism. "Until August 1945," opened one tract, "the Vietnamese people did not possess a point of view about communism, not having read much about communism, not having been explained about the meaning of communism." Another considered the 1940s to be a "period where the political consciousness of our people barely stepped out of colonialism" and, therefore, "was still low." In a third tract, Nguyen Manh Con, a leading cultural presence throughout the RVN, said that some "free Vietnamese in the Republic of Vietnam have committed the mistake of not comprehending the strategy of the enemy while having underestimated its action and tactics." The preface to Con's tract, written by the director of the Saigon government's "Condemn Communist" campaign, opined that "our side has a regrettable problem … which is a lack of adequate knowledge of Communist doctrines among people who had witnessed communist activities … and [conversely] a lack of witnessing of Communist activities on the part of intellectuals." This last point revealed the fear that noncommunist Vietnamese might have been given too much credit for the success of the Communist Party.[12] Combined with the recognition that the communists had held the upper hand in the quest for independence, the fear that Vietnamese could still be duped by communist policies and propaganda compelled anticommunists to wage a battle to win the hearts and minds of other Vietnamese—a battle that started well before the phrase became popular in American discourse about South Vietnam.

The Emergence of "Escape" and "Imprisonment" as Anticommunist Themes

In light of the large-scale migration in the mid-1950s from the north to the south, it is not surprising that an outstanding theme of the early South Vietnamese critique was fleeing or escaping communism. Three subtexts underscore this theme of escape. First, anticommunist writers consistently pointed to political, economic, and cultural repression as the main cause for fleeing Viet Minh rule. Second, they illustrated that although the majority of Vietnamese fled through legal channels, a large minority did so secretly, especially during the First Indochina War. Third, they showed that after the Geneva Conference, many northerners wrestled painfully with the decision to go south, only making the decision because they feared that staying would amount to imprisonment and possible death.

The third subtext was illustrated by a tract subtitled "Why I Migrated" and published at the end of 1954. At the start, the author recalled his hope that the French would keep their promise to protect Hanoi and Haiphong, only to learn with bitterness later that France had signed the Geneva Peace Accords and given control of the cities to the Viet Minh. He next described the difficulties that he and other northerners faced between "the end of July and the end of September" as they weighed their options. On the one hand, they saw banners that urged Hanoi residents to move south, heard about "enslaving policies" imposed in Viet Minh–controlled areas by the communists, and noted "insulting" attitudes against them from some working-class people on the streets. On the other hand, they felt uncertainty and fear about moving to an unfamiliar land. In the end, the author decided on the latter. He explains that the decision came from testimonies from both people that had spent some time in Viet Minh areas and those who were still there but could not leave. Ultimately, he thought the decision had to do with communist antagonism toward middle-class Vietnamese like himself. "The majority of Vietnamese in inner Hanoi were bourgeois and petit bourgeois," he wrote, "and the warfare waged at them has become more apparent and, in fact, was approaching its climax at the time."[13]

In a similar vein, Hoang Van Chi, later the author of an influential book on the North Vietnamese land reform, sympathized with the dilemma that many noncommunists had to face at the time. A chemist by training and a socialist by inclination, Chi joined the Viet Minh in 1942 and served as a military surgeon and director of the national mint, among other jobs. Nonetheless, he was classified as a "landlord" and put under arrest in 1954.[14] After release, Chi struggled with the decision to stay or to leave. "If I move south," he wrote in a periodical published by an émigré scholar,

"How would I learn anything about my brother that has been imprisoned for the past two years? Or how I could help my sister-in-law and her three young children?" Familial obligations played a major role during Chi's processing of his options and decision. However, he made up his mind after watching an "East German movie about Hitler's extermination of the Jews," because he "made a comparison and saw that Communism was crueler than Fascism." In his rationale, Hitler tried to kill Jews quickly, but "Ho Chi Minh, having betrayed anti-colonial Vietnamese nationalists, categorized them as reactionaries and landlords and isolated them so they would die gradually of hunger." There were no other alternatives but to migrate south, even if tugged by strong familial attachment and concern.[15]

To contemporary ears, Chi's comparison of communist practices with Hitler's anti-Semitic policies might have sounded overreaching, simplistic, or inappropriate. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the many fears among northerners regarding Viet Minh rule, especially the fear of being branded a member of the bourgeoisie. In a tract called *Tales of Escapees*, the author justified these fears by enumerating and elaborating on a number of economic and political policies in cities and the countryside. In scenes that foreshadowed postwar imposition of similar policies on the southern population, it described the rapidity of economic and political control by the new government. As the communists took over the management of governmental and military buildings, they assured the urban population that the Party would be "generous" to former collaborators of the French or the state of Vietnam. Quickly enough, though, the new rulers imposed a number of new taxes on private businesses, forced industrialists and merchants to attend a series of political meetings, and intimidated them into abandoning or signing over their businesses and property. Intimidation and control extended to other areas, including household registration and limited travel, accusations and trials of landlords in the countryside, and arrests and imprisonment of "complainers" and "reactionaries" in urban areas.[16]

The author of *Tales of Escapees* indicated that he wrote it at the Center for Welcoming Escapees, signifying urgency and immediacy about the post-Geneva migration. The rationale for the migration was further reinforced by a number of narratives about escaping Viet Minh rule *during* the First Indochina War. In a tract matter-of-factly entitled *Prisons and Escapes*, the narrator recounted his experiences of living in Viet Minh zones in central and northern Vietnam during the second half of the 1940s. Initially "invited" by the police to leave his village for the provincial town for his "own security," he and others were later accused of being "individual reactionaries" and held in one prison camp or another. Each of the camps held between 200 to 2,000 inmates; in turn, inmates were placed in barracks divided according

to gender and categories of political or "economic" prisoners. Even after release—and only to tightly Viet Minh–controlled areas—former inmates were required to report regularly to cadres. For these and other reasons, inmates turned their mind to devising one way or another to escape the camps for French-controlled or Catholic autonomous zones.[17]

In *Tales of Escapees* and similar narratives, communist prisons became a central image—and communist imprisonment a central theme—within the early South Vietnamese anticommunist critique. In one such tract, the author described at length his experience as a political prisoner during the First Indochina War and cited it as the main reason for his migration to the south. Another narrative, an eerie preview of postwar reeducation camps, described daily life in a Viet Minh labor camp as a mixture of political indoctrination ("auto-criticism, denunciation, and especially the compulsory accusation followed by torture"); manual labor in the field, complete with "producing competitions" to generate production among prisoners; and conditions that barely kept prisoners alive. At times, the critique drew parallels between colonial and communist imprisonment. Through describing different categories of Viet Minh imprisonment, *Prisons and Escapes* observed that the communist penitentiaries were similar to those previously run by the French in Con Dao and Lao Bao. The same was true of provincial prisons. "Communist imprisonment of nationalists at a high hill in Chu Le," the narrator wrote, "was not different from colonial imprisonment of Vietnamese patriots at Dac To and Dac Suat." He added that "colonialists and communists gave me the same designation": *homme dangeroux* and *nguoi nguy hiem* (dangerous person), respectively.[18]

In some ways, then, it was through the lens of colonialism that anticommunist writers sought to interpret the harrowing experiences of Viet Minh arrest, interrogations, imprisonment, and hard labor. Through this lens, they might have overstretched the parallels between the colonial and communist regimes while ignoring important differences in their goals and methods. However, by drawing similarities between communism and something familiar to the Vietnamese at large, they brought forth vivid images about life under communist rule, for which actual prisons and labor camps were only one part of the larger imprisonment.[19]

The Critique of Revolutionary Violence and Political Repression

The twin themes of imprisonment and escape drew attention to the Vietnamese experience of living under communist control. More importantly, they pointed to three larger categories in the anticommunist critique: revolutionary violence

and repression, class struggle, and thought control. Describing Viet Minh rule and escapes from it, anticommunist writers also addressed questions such as "Why such control?" and "From what have we escaped?" Their answers to these questions constituted the heart of the critique and helped provide an ideological rationale for the legitimacy of state-building in the RVN.

Because of the domination of the Viet Minh since 1945, an outstanding concern among anticommunist writers had to do with revolutionary violence against noncommunists during the August Revolution and the early part of the First Indochina War. Not unlike postwar overseas Vietnamese that spent an inordinate amount of ink on the unexpectedly rapid fall of the RVN in 1975 and pre-Renovation years, post-Geneva anticommunists wrote a great deal about the August Revolution, which caught them by surprise, and the following sixteen months, which led the Viet Minh to clear advantages over noncommunist nationalists. As one writer put it, the "communists gradually monopolized the resistance" while the noncommunist nationalist movement was "divided and broken up by their repression." For anticommunist authors, the Revolution and its immediate aftermath were significant for the extent of repression that the Viet Minh committed against its real and potential enemies.[20]

Accordingly, an alternate interpretation of the August Revolution began to float in anticommunist circles even before the First Indochina War and came to fruition at the beginning of South Vietnam. According to this interpretation, the Viet Minh took advantage of political uncertainty to seize power and the result was an illegal coup (the commonly used phrase was *cuop chinh quyen*, literally meaning "robbing the governing power"). But how did the Viet Minh manage to rob the governing power? A common attribution was their skillful manipulation of popular anticolonial sentiments and readiness for independence: "Such was the MILIEU," writes Nguyen Manh Con, "allowing the commencement of struggle [against colonialism]." When combined with the effective organization of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), popular support for the Viet Minh grew so quick that "in many areas . . . people eagerly awaited and actively looked for a 'young man cadre' to enlist, or help with money and weapons." Conceding the same point was Nghiem Ke To, author of the best-known history of the period 1945–1954 that was published under the Diem regime. Although the Viet Minh were lacking in number, they could dominate because of their "wise leadership" and because "time and attitudes among Vietnamese contributed directly" to the momentum that they seized.[21]

In the alternative interpretation, then, the collective Vietnamese desire for independence was intoxicating and, therefore, open for communist manipulation. An example of communist tactical effectiveness is the ICP's

decision in 1941 to emphasize the appeal for independence by naming its front organization the Vietnamese Independence League. But when Ho Chi Minh returned to southern Vietnam, the organization also took on an additional, shorter name, Viet Minh (Allied Vietnam), previously used by the better-known noncommunist Vietnamese Revolutionary League. The noncommunist League was driven by the colonial authorities into China; by the time it returned to Vietnam, it found its shorthand usurped and had to make do with the new shorthand Viet Cach (Revolutionary Vietnam). The tract considered the ICP's appropriation of the better-known shorthand skillful but also duplicitous.[22]

If anticommunists agreed on the skillfulness of the ICP in garnering popular support for independence, they were most critical of communist intention behind the aim of independence. Why oppose communism, Nguyen Manh Con asked, when communists declare independence and prosperity for the people? Because "according to Marx, [Vietnamese communists] do not believe in 'independence' as solution in itself." Another writer, the pamphleteer To Van, was more explicit in criticizing the ICP's drive for independence as the first phase in the Maoist doctrine of "three phases": national liberation, bourgeois populism, and "pure socialism". Paramount in the first two phases was winning support by creating political alliances across social classes and giving economic incentives such as tax reductions. But the goal was to gain enough power to move to the next phase, when the Communist Party would monopolize political power and shift from populism to socialism. Like many other writers, Van considered the dissolution of the ICP, the creation of a communist-led coalition government, and the creation of the second front (the Lien Viet) to be stepping stones in the path of these phases.[23]

If anticommunist writers thought political manipulation of the drive for independence was the right hand of communist strategy, they considered armed repression to be its left. South Vietnamese anticommunist literature stressed the ICP's liquidation of noncommunist leaders and followers as signs and symptoms of antinationalism, since only "foreigners" killed Vietnamese. In a tract written in the epistolary form, for example, Nguyen Manh Con reminded readers that the Viet Minh started to eliminate their opponents as early as the evening of August 19, 1945, barely a day into the Revolution. Over 200 members of the nationalist Restoration Militia in Bao Lac were invited to a Viet Minh banquet only to be arrested and killed. Other narratives, such as Nghiem Ke To's history, revealed the atmosphere of revolutionary intimidation. "The vast majority of cadres and lower-level local officials," To wrote, "were violent, inexperienced, and disrespectful young men; or ignorant, uneducated, and full of vengeful and selfish thinking." They stood ready to accuse anyone that did not show support or did not

show up for meetings of being "Vietnamese traitor" and "reactionary"; their vigor led to many "arrests" and "imprisonment." To concluded with a rhetorical question, "Who said that the 'successful' revolution was free of bloodshed?"[24] It was this bloodshed that formed the first component of the tripartite anticommunist critique.

The Critique of Class Struggle

Because the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of proletariat socialism were at the core of Marxism, a critique of class struggle was central to South Vietnamese anticommunist writers. Having considered revolutionary and armed repression as the first phase of communist consolidation of power, they focused on class struggle as the next step that was logical for the Viet Minh. They also considered it *the* major difference between communism and nationalism. Stressing, for instance, that the communists simultaneously fought the French and eliminated noncommunists, Thai Lang Nghiem concluded that the Communist Party did not "struggle for a nation, a people, a bourgeois society, but instead for a proletariat class" whose leadership, ironically, consisted of members from the bourgeoisie itself. Likewise, Nghiem Xuan Hong, who considered noncommunist bourgeoisie and intelligentsia to be in the best position to lead the construction of postcolonial Vietnam, reserved his strongest criticism for communist repression of these two groups.[25]

The South Vietnamese critique focused on a series of Hanoi's policies. As enumerated by To Van, there was a new income tax targeted at merchants and industrialists and a policy of monetary control (including gold) targeted at the general population, particularly at "bourgeois" families. A third policy was "housing control," aimed at confiscating houses and land that belonged to foreign nationals and Vietnamese families that had left for the south. A fourth was "state labor" policy that forced the poor and unemployed to perform state projects, while a fifth (and the most important) was land reform targeted at landlords as well as urbanites with land in the countryside.[26] In short, these policies targeted two groups of noncommunist Vietnamese: landlords and the bourgeoisie. The first group was visible in the land reform that began in Viet Minh–controlled areas before the Geneva Conference and continued throughout the rest of North Vietnam until 1956. The second group was targeted after the communists took over urban areas after the Geneva Conference and concentrated in urban areas.[27]

In their critique of class struggle, anticommunist writers shifted from the August Revolution to the First Indochina War, especially its second half. Some accounts dated the shift at the end of 1950, after the anniversary of

the October Revolution in the Soviet Union. One tract, for example, stated that it "was then that [new] policies about agricultural taxes were elevated to their crucial place, so to create appropriate conditions for the [new] war on class struggle." Nguyen Manh Con, too, considered the same year crucial, particularly because it coincided with the reemergence of the Communist Party under the new name Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP). Other writers dated it later, and Nghiem Xuan Hong marked 1951–1952 as the dividing line of the two stages.[28] All the same, anticommunist writers concurred that the early 1950s marked the complete break of the already tenuous communist-nationalist coalition.[29]

The critique of communist antagonism to the bourgeoisie appealed to tradition and argued that the VWP was imposing an alien doctrine on postcolonial Vietnam. "Our society has never had class divisions so extreme," one tract declared, "that led to the conflicts of interests, as in Western societies." It added that Vietnamese society has been "incapable of producing capitalists that took all resources in their hands, or laborers that lost all opportunities and resources for independence." The implication is that the Vietnamese tradition was more egalitarian than was portrayed by the VWP. At the same time, some parts of the critique related to the affinity that many anticommunists had for the ideals of the French Revolution. However anticolonial anticommunists were, they were as sympathetic to the French Revolution as they were opposed to the Russian Revolution. One tract, for example, declared that the "French Revolution of 1870 was a most daring and progressive revolution in modern history" and "yet it respected *private property* and guaranteed *individual liberty*" (original emphasis).[30]

France was not the only Western noncommunist country that received positive references in the critique of class struggle. Great Britain and the United States were also mentioned at times, usually as counterweights to Marxist convictions about inherent linkages between class warfare and economic development. Some writers, such as the future provincial chief Nguyen Tran, defended Western capitalism and stated that Marxist analysis in 1850 "has no more merit . . . because American capitalism in 1950 was not the same as one hundred years before" and that "American workers now have a higher standard of living than [Western] European workers, and European workers have a higher standard of living than workers in our country." Instances such as these reveal the influence exerted by the global Cold War on the early South Vietnamese anticommunist discourse. Moreover, because the discourse considered Vietnamese communists a part of the worldwide communist movement, there were expectedly many more references to Soviet Union and China. Hence, the discourse interpreted the fact that the Viet Minh started land reform before the end of the First

Indochina War by placing it in the international context: namely, the timing of the campaign owed itself to the Chinese communist victory in 1949 as well as to Soviet criticism of the Viet Minh for slowness in building socialism.[31] In this respect, the discourse aligned itself firmly with American and European anticommunist ideas and rhetoric.

Nonetheless, it was not Western but nationalist ideas and local experiences that dominated narration and shaped the basic contours of the early South Vietnamese anticommunist discourse. Many publications, for example, are stories, tales, anecdotes, and other narratives illustrating serious problems faced by property owners. As exemplified by *Tales of Escapees*, anticommunist writers zoomed in on the rapid pace of economic control imposed on residents of Hai Phong and other urban areas. In July 1955, for instance, the cadres immediately made demands on businesses and citizens to pay a new "improvement tax" on urban industries and buildings. The following month saw the new monetary policies that required families and businesses to itemize their gold and silver while putting gold and silver trading under state control. September saw new policies that gave the state increasing control on housing.[32] Similar to postwar antibourgeois policies in the second half of the 1970s, speedy legal and economic measures were employed to establish the Party's hegemony over economic activities.

The anticommunist critique paid even more attention to class struggle in the countryside. According to one tract, the VWP depended on a class-based formula to achieve its initial aims in land reform: the Party should "depend on landless peasants, unite with owners of little land, neutralize middle-class farmers, and demolish wealthy landowners."[33] Subsequent rounds of reform would strip property from middle-class owners, hence providing state-controlled land to the lowest rungs of farmers for production goals as well as creating moral debts toward the Party. Another theme is the ways that cadres ritualized tax policies and tax collections to homogenize an environment of loyalty to the Party. One tract details a "tax-collecting parade" in which the cadres organized a nine-hour parade, complete with a revolutionary percussion youth band, in a village that concluded with taxpayers publicly and ritually make "tax donations" as well as "vows" of upholding their tax-paying duties in the future.[34]

The critique of communist policies and practices about taxes and property was linked to the preference of anticommunists for a probourgeois society in postcolonial Vietnam. Here is not the place to discuss the preference, but it suffices to note that they interpreted class struggle as the crucial cause of political and cultural disorder in the country. As summarized by one writer, communist policies led to the elimination of four related arenas of Vietnamese life: private ownership, families, nationalism, and religious

worship. In the end, communist policies "have harmed the country, made the people miserable, and created havoc to the order of our families and society."[35] The critique of class struggle, then, was not merely about an economic critique. Certainly, it was concerned with private property, but it was also a critique of communist beliefs about the nation, the family, and the role of religious beliefs and practices in both of those entities. It was a critique of communist instigation of hatred among the Vietnamese people, a hatred that played against postcolonial aspirations for political independence and economic propensity.

Ultimately, the anticommunist critique of class warfare was concerned about the direction of developing a postcolonial Vietnam that would be appropriate to "Vietnamese values" and tradition. The critique considered Marxist class warfare as a wrong-headed tool for analysis of Vietnamese history and culture, and contended that Marxism simplified Vietnamese history to a history of production, ignoring cultural values that emphasize the role of the family, the village, and other "humane" institutions. In its single-mindedness, the critique of class struggle strayed off at times. In the main, however, it linked itself to the critique of revolutionary violence as evidence of communism as an inherently antinationalist project.

The Critique of Thought Control

The last piece of the tripartite critique was aimed at communist efforts at brainwashing and thought control. The writers considered the three parts to be interdependent: that is, revolutionary violence and repression eliminated the most important political opponents; class struggle mobilized peasants to denounce and eliminate real and potential economic opponents of the Communist Party; and control of cultural productions placed Vietnamese of all stripes at the mercy of the Party over what to express and what not to express. There were also accompanying stages: just as revolutionary violence cleared the field for ridding Vietnamese society of the bourgeoisie, class struggle formed the basis for communist promotion and patronage of socialist realism over anything else. But as stated by the émigré Nguyen Dang Thuc, a prominent professor at the University of Saigon, "Vietnamese arts today carry ideals of nationalism, not ideals of class struggle."[36] Anticommunist writers believed that as the basis for the building of postcolonial Vietnam, class struggle was a deeply wrong basis for cultural productions as it was for economic development.

The early South Vietnamese critique of thought control was centered on what is commonly known as the *Nhan Van Giai Pham* Affair. The name of the Affair refers to the two periodicals—*Nhan Van (Humanity)* and *Giai*

Pham (Beautiful Works)—that were published in Hanoi between 1955 and 1957 by two groups of dissident intellectuals and artists. The VWP initially allowed the publication of the journals due in part to post-Stalin revisionism in the Soviet Union. However, it quickly found the journals too critical of its control of the arts, especially the advocacy of socialist realism at the exclusion of other strands of thought and ideas. Unlike a number of renowned writers and artists who had previously denounced their Romanticism-influenced works in favor of revolutionary literature, the dissident intellectuals derided the state through a number of essays, poems, and cartoons. In addition, dissident criticism included some against the botched land reform whose inadequacies, the VWP, with characteristic euphemisms, admitted in mid-1956. By the end of the year, the Party launched an "anti-revisionist" attack against the journals. Articles, essays, and "letters from readers" appeared in government-approved magazines and newspapers, and the Hanoi government put a number of dissidents on trial or forced them to recant their writings.[37]

Expectedly, the Affair was a cause célèbre among South Vietnamese anticommunists. Many of them considered themselves members of the intelligentsia and, therefore, perfect targets of the Party had they lived in the north. Widely published were details about the writers and their trials and reprinting of selected writings from the two journals. Anticommunist writers praised the dissidents while denouncing the suppression of the VWP. They also leveled strong criticism at writers who were established and independent, but who later followed the official line and openly criticized the dissidents for not supporting the Revolution.[38]

More importantly, the Affair provided South Vietnamese anticommunist writers a strong and clear case against thought control. In their view, the VWP moved from cultural hegemony to total control, doing to culture what it had done to politics and economics. They interpreted the Affair to be the last steps in the process of consolidation toward a totalitarian state, with features borrowed from Stalinism and Maoism in addition to Marxist-Leninism. Indeed, while the critique of thought control zoomed in on the Affair, it made notes that there had been already a process of thought control at work. Some writers dated the beginning of the process to 1950, when the Viet Minh was explicit about what writers, musicians, and artists could and could not produce.

One related case was that of Nguyen Son, a Viet Minh military officer and district commander during the First Indochina War, but also a "Tito among Vietnamese Communists" because he allegedly cared only for national liberation but not for expansion of the Party's power and influence. Before 1950, Son was something of a protector and patron of noncommunist writers that joined the Viet Minh, using his influence to allow them to

create nationalistic works. After the Chinese communists' victory, however, Son was sent to China, leaving noncommunist writers and artists bereft of protection and, consequentially, productions. The fact that the *Humanity* published an obituary after Son's death in 1956 suggested to South Vietnamese writers that the previous connection between him and dissident writers was another reason for the outright suppression of any thinking that deviated from the Party's official line.[39]

Anticommunist writers also interpreted the arrests of dissident writers as symptoms of the larger antirevisionist character of the VWP. Not only non-communists but even members of the Party could be easily put away for signs of deviation. One tract, for example, discussed Yugoslav revisionism of Marxist orthodoxy and reactions to it from several communist countries. It quoted and summarized antirevisionist criticisms by leading communists, including members of the Vietnamese Politburo Le Duan. Next, it published a number of "self-corrections" by several prominent North Vietnamese writers and scholars, written out of pressure by the VWP to renounce any possible revisionist thinking about the Party or the country.[40] The implication was clear: even if party members desired changes, they were at the mercy of the leadership at the top, which concentrated power in the hand of a minority and which would not have permitted any changes in ideology or structure.

Similar to the critique of class struggle, the critique of thought control extended its arguments against communist policing of ideas and cultural productions as also against the nation. Anticommunists appealed to tradition and family as a basis against thought control; for many of them, dread of communist brainwashing came from the Marxist project of creating the "new person" in a "new society," which was antinationalistic for anticommunists. Since the new society was to be "pure socialist," the creation of the "new person" would involve two stages. In the first stage, the Communist Party would disconnect Vietnamese from their "ancestral customs" and influences from "family, religion, and morals." In the next, they would introduce new customs and principles, and remake each Vietnamese to be a "child of the Revolution" instead of a mother and father.[41] For anticommunist writers, thought control was the logical extension of this introduction of the "new" and elimination of the "old," in effect, the elimination of long-standing cultural tradition and heritage.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates only one aspect of South Vietnamese anticommunism, namely, an ideological and intellectual critique of the Vietnamese Communist Party developed for the most part by northern émigrés during the first years

of the divisional period. Of course, South Vietnamese anticommunism encompassed a lot more, as exemplified by political or cultural organizations such as the Boys Scouts and Diem-sponsored Republican Youths, or by local links to international and regional anticommunist organizations such as the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League. Moreover, there was not a monolithic kind of anticommunism but an array of forms that took shape on the basis of religion, social class, regionalism, and other variables. Adherents of the Cao Dai sect in the south and members of the Dai Viet political party in the north were all anticommunist, but their experiences with the Viet Minh during the First Indochina War were not necessarily the same. This in turn could have shaped their views somewhat differently from one another. A full study of the topic would necessarily include examples like these organizations and activities.

Nonetheless, as shown by this chapter, there was a considerable ideological rationale behind the activities of South Vietnamese anticommunist organizations and individuals. Aided by a sizable infusion of cultural and political writers of northern origin, this critique developed in full swing after the Geneva Conference. While the critique contained elements of Cold War rhetoric and ideas, it was largely a native product rooted in various readings of Vietnam's recent past. In places, the critique was simplified and exaggerated. As a whole, however, it was tight and coherent and helped to shape a political language for the remainder of the existence of South Vietnam.

Unlike the RVN that collapsed and disappeared in the spring of 1975, the South Vietnamese critique of communism continued after the war. Its thematic emphases on escape and imprisonment found confirmation in developments in the decade following reunification: antibourgeois economic policies, imprisonment of former RVN officials and ARVN officers in reeducation camps, and waves of "boat people" fleeing the country. Anticommunist writers that remained behind were arrested and sent to prison; a few, most notably Nguyen Manh Con, paid with their lives there. It took until the second half of the 1980s, after the failures of collectivization became apparent, for the postwar leadership to begin shifting gears in the form of Renovation (*doi moi*). The imprisonments and deaths of Nguyen Manh Con and others were a direct testimony to their previous efforts to alert their fellow countrymen and women to the hazards of applying, in their view, an alien ideology to the construction of a postcolonial Vietnamese nation.

CHAPTER 3

"To Be Patriotic is to Build Socialism": Communist Ideology in Vietnam's Civil War

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Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was the instigator and victor in the Vietnamese civil war (1959–1975). It was led by a communist party (the Vietnamese Workers' Party, or VWP) that had displayed a particularly sharp binary worldview since at least the 1940s.[1] To communist leaders, the world was divided into two opposing camps. The socialist camp was imagined as a paradise in which peace, happiness, and goodwill ruled. In contrast, the capitalist or imperialist camp symbolized everything that was bad, including war, suffering, and exploitation. The interests of the two camps were fundamentally opposed and a war of mutual destruction between them was inevitable. Yet, because history was viewed as following a linear progressive path and the socialist camp represented progress, this camp was expected to triumph in such a war.

This binary worldview of Vietnamese communists was remarkably consistent throughout the 1940s. As reality did not conform to what was imagined, it was modified but never abandoned. Regardless of what happened, communist leaders enthusiastically identified themselves with the revolutionary camp. In the darkest moments, when no support from this camp was forthcoming, they did not cease associating themselves mentally with the Soviet Union, imagining about it, and displaying their admiration for it. Their loyalty explains why, when the Cold War arrived in Asia in the late 1940s, DRV leaders volunteered to fight it on the front line for the socialist

South Vietnam's Struggle for Legitimacy, 1954–1960," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 2 (April 2009): 293–313; on Sukarno's manipulation of the Soviet Union, see Ragna Boden, "Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 110–28.

28. Berger, *Battle for Asia.*
29. Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Yale Ferguson and Rey Koslowski, "Culture, International Relations Theory, and Cold War History," in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*; Andrew Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, "'East is East and West is West?' Towards a Comparative Socio-Cultural History of the Cold War," in *Across the Blocs.*
30. Akira Iriye, "Culture," *Journal of American History* 77, no. 1 (June 1990): 99–107.
31. Some, such as Steven Levine, define the first category as "informal ideologies" and the second category as "formal ideologies." See Levine, "Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy," in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). In his *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia*, Stephen Morris also uses "informal" and "formal" adjectives to define "political culture." Here I use "ideologies" in the sense of formal ideologies. Ted Hopf assumes the existence of a "social cognitive structure" that "establishes the boundaries of discourse within a society, including how individuals think about themselves and others." Hopf's concept of "identity," which is derived from this social cognitive structure, incorporates both categories in my scheme. See Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 & 1999* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 6.
32. Harold Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India* (New York: John Day, 1958).
33. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds;* Akira Iriye, *Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); Liao Kuang-Sheng, *Antiforeignism and Modernization in China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990); Jonathan Goldstein et al., *America Views China* (London: Associated University Press, 1991); Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui, eds., *Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations* (New York: University Press of America, 1999); and Rotter, *Comrades at Odds.*
34. Liao, *Antiforeignism and Modernization.*
35. Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
36. Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order.*
37. For thoughtful analyses of the two disciplines and possibilities for collaboration, see Colin Elman and Miriam Elma, eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

38. Allen Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
39. Iriye, *Mutual Images.*
40. Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order,* 15–16.
41. Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam & America*; Qing, *From Allies to Enemies.*
42. Bradley is thin on internationalist thinking among Vietnamese communists, and Qing underestimates the importance of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to Chinese communists. On these issues, see Vu, "From Cheering to Volunteering," and Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism.*
43. Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Goscha, *Vietnam or Indochina?*; Shawn McHale, *Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004); and Tuong Vu, *Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chapters 8 and 9.
44. Tuong Vu, "Dreams of Paradise: The Making of a Soviet Outpost in Vietnam," *Ab Imperio,* no. 2 (2008): 255–85.
45. Goscha, *Vietnam or Indochina?*
46. Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900–1942* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973).
47. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, 188; Joseph Esherick, "'How the Qing Became China," in *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World,* ed. Joseph Esherick et al. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
48. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, 188.
49. See Westad, *Global Cold War*, chapter 8.
50. See Tuong Vu, "Vietnamese Political Studies and Debates on Vietnamese Nationalism," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 2, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 187–230.

Chapter 2

1. George McT. Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York: Anchor Books, 1987) is a rare major study with the entry "anticommunism" in the index. But it refers exclusively to American anticommunism. See p. 539.
2. Robert Brigham, *ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 120.
3. Gerard J. DeGroot, *A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War* (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 84–5. This book is similar to other general histories in having an American-centric focus. However, it diverges from them in its view of the Vietnamese revolution. As described in a historiographic essay, DeGroot views the communist-led revolution as having "relied as much upon indoctrination and terror in its pursuit of power as it did upon the political dividends from its association with national liberation and the redistribution of land." Seen in this way, the United States "could not be expected to remain entirely sanguine when

confronted, as it was in the early 1960s, by a concerted communist challenge to its credibility across the Third World." Although DeGroot qualifies this by saying that the weakness of the South Vietnamese anticommunists "made the country an inappropriate theatre" for U.S. intervention, the book is notable for giving nuances to the long-standing view that the intervention was unnecessary and shortsighted in the first place. See Kendrick Oliver, "Towards a New Moral History of the Vietnam War," *Historical Journal* 47, no. 3 (September 2004): 761.

4. See, for example, Neil L. Jamieson, *Understanding Vietnam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), esp. 100–233.
5. For example, Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also chapters by Tuong Vu and Bernd Schaefer in this volume.
6. Almost uniformly, recent Diem-centered scholarship utilizes South Vietnamese as well as Western sources. See Philip E. Catton, *Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002); Edward Miller, "Vision, Power, and Agency: The Ascent of Ngo Dinh Diem, 1945–1954," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 35, no. 3 (October 2004): 433–58; Jessica M. Chapman, "Staging Democracy: South Vietnam's 1955 Referendum to Depose Bao Dai," *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 4 (September 2006): 671–703; and Matthew Masur, "Exhibiting Signs of Resistance: South Vietnam's Struggle for Legitimacy, 1954–1960," *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 2 (April 2009): 293–313. An important work that does not use Vietnamese sources is Kathryn Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2007).
7. An example is Nghiem Xuan Thien, publisher of the daily *Thoi Luan* and author of one anticommunist tract and editor of another that are cited in this article. According to Nguyen Duy Hinh and Tran Dinh Tho, *The South Vietnamese Society* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 131, in the March 15, 1958, issue of *Thoi Luan*, Thien "alerted the public to the threat posed by Diem's policies that alienated the people. Mr. Diem, irate, ordered him sentenced to ten months in prison, seized the offending newspaper issue, and suspended its publication." It should be noted, however, that the relationship between the regime and other anticommunist groups was a lot more complex than the above scenario. One example is the retention of members from several Dai Viet political parties during the regime's consolidation of power in the period 1955–1956. While some members were sent to prison, others were kept in "centers" that allowed for more fluid interactions. At the Bien Hoa Center in 1956, for instance, Dai Viet leaders persuaded the government to let them organize "anticommunist training." Among lecturers in training were Thai Lang Nghiem and To Van, who, after release, published three of the anticommunist tracts cited in this article. In particular, the government's "Department of Communication bought many copies" of To Van's tract and "sent them to various localities to be used for political education." See Quang Minh, *Cach Mang Viet Nam Thoi Can Kim: Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang 1938–1995* [*Revolutionary Vietnam in Modern Time: The Great Viet Nationalist Party 1938–1995*], 2nd ed. (Westminster, CA: Van Nghe, 2000), 264.
8. Vo Phien, *Literature in South Vietnam, 1954–1975* (Melbourne: Vietnamese Language and Culture Publications, 1992), 124.
9. The large non-Catholic presence of the northern émigrés could be spotted in *Nhan Vat Viet Nam* [*Who's Who of Vietnam*] (Saigon: Viet Nam Thong Tan Xa, 1973), whose individual profiles usually include religious backgrounds. Among major cultural émigré figures listed in this *Who's Who* are the journalist Tam Lang; the actress Kieu Chinh; the film director Doan Chau Mau; the publisher Nguyen Dinh Vuong; the musicians Pham Duy and Pham Dinh Chuong; the photographers Tran Cao Linh and Nguyen Cao Dam; the novelists Nhat Tien and Duyen Anh; the poets Cung Tram Tuong and Vu Hoang Chuong; and the scholars Toan Anh, Nguyen Dang Thuc, Nghiem Tham, and Pham Cong Thien. None of them were Catholic. The same was true of many other émigrés listed to have held important political, military, and economic positions in South Vietnam.
10. Nghiem Xuan Hong, *Lich Trinh Dien Tien cua Phong Trao Quoc Gia Viet Nam* [*Chronological Development of the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement*] (Saigon: Quan Diem, 1958), 124. Hong was considered a leading South Vietnamese theorist on noncommunist nationalism.
11. Nhi Hung, *Thanh Nien Quoc Gia duoi Ach Viet Cong* [*Nationalist Youths under Communist Yokes*] (Saigon: 1956); this book won a prize in the 1956 national contest sponsored by the Office of Culture under the Department of Communication in the Diem government. Thai Lang Nghiem, *Doan Ket Luan* [*Essay on Unity*] (Saigon: Kinh Duong, 1957), and *Ban ve Thong Nhat Dat Nuoc* [*Discussion on National Reunion*] (Saigon: Kinh Duong, 1959).
12. Phan Van Thu, *Chu Nghia Cong San voi Xa Hoi Viet Nam* [*Communism and the Vietnamese Society*] (Saigon: 1954), 5; Thai Lang Nghiem, *Doan Ket Luan*, 69; and Nguyen Kien Trung, *Viet Minh, Nguoi Di Dau?* [*Viet Minh, Where Have You Gone?*] (Saigon: 1957), iii and 7. Nguyen Kien Trung was a pen name of Nguyen Manh Con.
13. Hung Thanh, *Vao Nam (Vi Sao Toi Di Cu?)* [*Going South: Why did I Migrate?*] (Saigon: Tia Nang, 1954), 8.
14. Hoang Van Chi, *The Fate of the Last Viets* (Saigon: Hoa Mai, 1956), 7–8 and 30.
15. Hoang Van Chi, "Phat Roi Le" ["Weeping Buddha"], *Van Nghe Tap San* [*Journal of the Arts*] 6 (October 1955): 110–111. Because some of his writings were published in English, Chi was probably the best-known early South Vietnamese anticommunist writer in the West. He dedicated *The Fate of the Last Viets* to his imprisoned brother, his sister-in-law, and their children.
16. Nguyen Ngoc Thanh, *Truyen Nguoi Vuot Tuyen* [*Tales of Escapees*] (Saigon: 1959).
17. Thanh Thao, *Tu Nguc va Thoat Ly* [*Prisons and Escapes*] (Saigon: 1957).

18. To Quang Son, *Tai Sao Toi Chon Mien Nam Thanh Tri Nhan Vi* [*Why Did I Choose the South, the Fort of Personalism*] (Saigon: Phan Thanh Gian, 1963); Nguyen Dinh Lang, "The Horrid Fate of Prisoners-of-War in Viet Cong Hands," in *Blood On Their Hands: A Collection of True Stories, Stories of Actual Happenings, Compiled by "La Gazette de Saigon" (September–December 1955),* ed. Nghiem Xuan Thien (Saigon: Thoi Luan, 1956), 62–65; and Thanh Thao, *Tu Nguc va Thoat Ly*, 90.
19. The communist-colonialist parallel could be seen in other examples of South Vietnamese anticommunist discourse, such as on the Geneva Conference. Anticommunists consistently contended that it was a decision made by the French and the Viet Minh without regard to other Vietnamese voices.
20. Nghiem Xuan Hong, *Lich Trinh Dien Tien cua Phong Trao Quoc Gia Viet Nam*, 70. On Viet Minh violence, see François Guilletmot, "Au coeur de la fracture vietnamienne: L'élimination de l'opposition nationaliste et anticolonialiste dans le Nord du Vietnam (1945–1956)," in *Naissance d'un État-Parti: Le Viêt Nam depuis 1945 / The Birth of a Party-State: Vietnam since 1945,* ed. Christopher E. Goscha and Benoît De Trégodé (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2004), 175–216. See also Shawn McHale, "Freedom, Violence, and the Struggle over the Public Arena in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–1958" in the same volume, 81–99; and David G. Marr, *Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 232–7.
21. Nguyen Kien Trung, *Dem Tam Tinh Viet Lich Su*, 31 and 33; and Nghiem Ke To, *Viet Nam Mau Lua* [*Vietnam in Bloodshed*] (Saigon: Mai Linh, 1954), 35.
22. To Van, *Sach Luoc Ba Giai Doan cua Cong San* [*Communist Strategy in Three Phases*] (Saigon: Chong Cong, 1956), 27 and 31.
23. Nguyen Kien Trung, *Dem Tam Tinh Viet Lich Su*, 66; and To Van, *Sach Luoc Ba Giai Doan cua Cong San*, 10–11 and 37.
24. Nguyen Kien Trung, *Dem Tam Tinh Viet Lich Su*, 61–62; and Nghiem Ke To, *Viet Nam Mau Lua*, 49.
25. Thai Lang Nghiem, *Doan Ket Luan*, 90–91; and Nghiem Xuan Hong, *Lich Trinh Dien Tien cua Phong Trao Quoc Gia Viet Nam*, 77.
26. To Van, *Sach Luoc Ba Giai Doan cua Cong San*, 42–43.
27. On land reform, see Edwin E. Moise, *Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); and Balazs Szalontai, "Political and Economic Crisis in North Vietnam, 1955–56," *Cold War History* 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 395–426.
28. Nguyen Van Lang, *Nhung Hien Tuong Dau Tranh Giai Cap ngoai Vi Tuyen 17* [*Phenomena of Class Struggle above the Seventeenth Parallel*] (Saigon: Thu Lam An Thu Quan, 1958), 44; Nguyen Kien Trung, *Viet Minh Nguoi Di Dau*, 75; and Nghiem Xuan Hong, *Lich Trinh Dien Tien cua Phong Trao Quoc Gia Viet Nam*, 75.
29. It has been suggested that the Viet Minh's rapid shift from downplaying to active promotion of class warfare had to do with the Viet Minh's initial difficulties in getting support from the Soviet Union. During most of the 1940s, Stalin was deeply concerned with Tito's orientation and had serious doubts about Ho Chi Minh's loyalty to international communism. Even in early 1950, the Viet Minh's prospects for Soviet recognition remained dim, and it was only with critical backing from Mao and the Chinese communists that the Viet Minh obtained the desired recognition. In return, it enthusiastically sped up socialist political and economic measures to prove allegiance to the international line. See Christopher E. Goscha, "Courting Diplomatic Disaster? The Difficult Integration of Vietnam into the Internationalist Communist Movement (1945–1950)," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 1, nos. 1–2 (Fall 2006): 59–103.

30. Phan Van Thu, *Chu Nghia Cong San voi Xa Hoi Viet Nam*, 8 and 38.
31. Nguyen Tran, *Che Do Cong San* [*The Communist Regime*] (Saigon: Dong Nam A, 1958), 24; and Nguyen Van Lang, *Nhung Hien Tuong Dau Tranh Giai Cap ngoai Vi Tuyen 17*, 23–4.
32. Nguyen Ngoc Thanh, *Truyen Nguoi Vuot Tuyen*, 15–42.
33. Nguyen Van Lang, *Nhung Hien Tuong Dau Tranh Giai Cap ngoai Vi Tuyen 17*, 62.
34. Vu Dinh Vinh, *Ben Kia Buc Man Tre* [*On the Other Side of the Bamboo Curtain*] (Saigon: Phuong Hoang, 1956), 22–4.
35. Phan Van Thu, *Chu Nghia Cong San voi Xa Hoi Viet Nam*, 28.
36. Nguyen Dang Thuc, "Van nghe dan toc hay van nghe giai cap?" ["A Nationalist or a Class-based Culture?"] *Van Nghe Tap San* 5 (September 1955): 1–7.
37. On the Affair, see Kim N. B. Ninh, *A World Transformed: The Politics of Culture in Revolutionary Vietnam, 1945–1967* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 121–63; Shawn McHale, "Vietnamese Marxism, Dissent, and the Politics of Postcolonial Memory: Tran Duc Thao, 1946–1993," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 1 (February 2002): 7–31; and Tuan Ngoc Nguyen, "Socialist Realism in Vietnamese Literature: An Analysis of the Relationship between Literature and Politics" (PhD diss., Victoria University, 2004), 216–53.
38. For examples, *Tram Hoa Dua No tren Dat Bac* [*Hundreds of Blooming Flowers in the North*] (Saigon: Mat Tran Bao Ve Tu Do Van Hoa, 1959); and *So Phan Tri Thuc Mien Bac (qua Vu Tran Duc Thao)* [*The Fate of the Northern Intelligentsia (through the Case of Tran Duc Thao)*] (Saigon: Van Huu A Chau, 1959); Nguyen Van An, *Vu An Dau Tranh Tu Tuong o Mien Bac* [*The Case of Ideological Struggle in the North*] (Saigon: Nguyen Van An, 1960); and Nguyen Van An, *Phan Khoi va Cuoc Dau Tranh Tu Tuong o Mien Bac* [*Phan Khoi and the Ideological Struggle in the North*] (Saigon: Uy Ban Trung Uong Chong Chinh Sach No Dich Van Hoa o Mien Bac, 1961). Responsible for the last publication was the organization Central Committee against Ideological Repression in the North.
39. *Tram Hoa Dua No tren Dat Bac*, 20–2.

40. Quoc Bao, *Phong Trao Khao Duyet lai Mac-Xit* [*Movement for Marxist Revisionism*] (Place not known: 1959).
41. Nghiem Xuan Thien, *Phong Trao Quoc Gia Viet Nam* [*The Vietnamese Nationalist Movement*] (Saigon: An Quan Vo Van Van, 1955), 184–5.

Chapter 3

1. Tuong Vu, "'From Cheering to Volunteering': Vietnamese Communists and the Arrival of the Cold War," in *Connecting Histories: The Cold War and Decolonization in Asia (1945–1962)*, ed. Christopher Goscha and Christian Ostermann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).
2. George Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986); Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990); Mark Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam & America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and George Herring, *America's Longest War*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002).
3. W. R. Smyser, *Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism between Russia and China, 1956–1969* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1980).
4. Martin Grossheim, "Revisionism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: New Evidence from the East German Archives," *Cold War History* 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 451–77; and Sophie Quinn-Judge, "The Ideological Debate in the DRV and the Significance of the Anti-Party Affair, 1967–68," *Cold War History* 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 479–500.
5. Pierre Asselin, "Choosing Peace: Hanoi and the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, 1954–1955," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 95–126.
6. Dali Yang, *Calamity and Reform in China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).
7. "Ve tinh hinh truoc mat va nhiem vu cai cach ruong dat" ["On the situation and our task of land reform"], January 25, 1953, Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Vietnamese Communist Party), *Van Kien Dang Toan Tap* v. 14 [*Collection of Party Documents*, hereafter VKDTT]: 18.
8. Ibid., 14–9.
9. "Bao cao cua Tong Bi Thu Truong Chinh" ["Report by Secretary General Truong Chinh"], VKDTT 14: 32.
10. Ibid., 32–4.
11. For discussion of Stalin's ideas in this book, see John Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
12. Ibid., 52–3.
13. Ibid., 53–4.
14. Tuong Vu, *Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 5.

15. Nguyen Vu Tung, "Coping with the United States: Hanoi's search for an effective strategy," in *The Vietnam War*, ed. Peter Lowe (London: Macmillan, 1998), 39.
16. "Thong tri cua Ban Bi Thu ve loi tuyen bo cua Ho Chu tich voi nha bao Thuy Dien" ["Party Secretariat's Circulation on Chairman Ho's talk with Swedish journalist"], December 27, 1953, VKDTT 14: 555.
17. See, for example, Ty Tuyen Truyen Van Nghe Yen Bai [Yen Bai Art Propaganda Department], *Chuc Tho Mao Chu Tich Sau Muoi Tuoi* [*Celebrate Chairman Mao's sixtieth birthday*] (Yen Bai, 1953).
18. See Dang Xa Hoi Viet Nam [Socialist Party], *Thang Huu Nghi Viet-Trung-Xo voi nguoi tri thuc Vietnam* [*Vietnamese intellectuals and Vietnamese-Chinese-Soviet Friendship Month*] (Viet Bac, 1954).
19. For example, see Hoang Quoc Viet, *Chung toi da thay gi o nuoc Trung hoa vi dai* [*What we have seen in Great China*] (Hoi Huu Nghi Viet-Trung Lien Khu, 1953), 5.
20. C. B., "147 tuoi ma van thanh nien" ["Still a young man despite being 147 years old"], *Nhan Dan*, October 17, 1965, reprinted in C. B. (Ho Chi Minh), *Lien Xo Vi Dai* [*The Great Soviet Union*] (Hanoi: Nhan Dan, 1956): 26–7.
21. D. X., "Mo cha khong khoc, khoc mo moi" ["They care about strangers but not their own people; literally, they cried not at their father's grave but at a pile of dirt"], *Cuu Quoc*, October 12, 1951. Reprinted in C. B. et al. (Ho Chi Minh), *Noi Chuyen My* ... [*Talking about America*] (Hanoi: Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1972), 31. (This is a collection of articles written by Ho Chi Minh under various pennames such as C. B. and D. X.).
22. Ho apparently read the news story in the French media.
23. C. B. (Ho Chi Minh), "My ma: Phong khong thuan, tuc khong my" ["America: Coarse and ugly customs"], *Nhan Dan*, September 1, 1954.
24. C. B., "Mot 'gia dinh guong mau' cua My" ["A model family of America"], *Nhan Dan*, February 16, 1956.
25. See "English 'colonization'" (1923), "Lynching, a little known aspect of American civilization" (1924), and "The Ku-Klux-Klan" (1924), reprinted in Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works*, v. 1 (1922–1926) (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960).
26. D. X., "My la xau" ["America means ugliness"], *Cuu Quoc*, November 3, 1951. Reprinted in C. B. et al, *Noi Chuyen My*, 30.
27. C. B., "Dao duc cua My"["American morality"], *Nhan Dan*, June 14, 1951. Reprinted in C. B. et al., *Noi Chuyen My*, 97.
28. Ho Chi Minh, "Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau" ["Report at the Sixth Central Committee Plenum"], July 15, 1954, VKDTT 15: 165.
29. This refers to the Manila conference (September 3, 1954), the Paris Agreement (October 23, 1954), and the U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act (December 2, 1954).
30. "Ket luan cuoc thao luan o Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu bay" ["Conclusions to the discussion at the Seventh Plenum"], March 3–12, 1955, VKDTT 16: 177.